Showing posts with label Jim Hietala. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jim Hietala. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

The Open Group San Diego Panel Explores Global Cybersecurity Issues for Improved Enterprise Integrity and Risk Mitigation

Transcript of a live panel discussion at February's The Open Group San Diego 2015.

Welcome to a special BriefingsDirect panel discussion overview from The Open Group San Diego 2105 on Feb. 2 through 5, 2015. Download a copy of the transcript.

The group, which examines issues and improvements for global enterprise cybersecurity, consists of moderator Dave Lounsbury, Chief Technology Officer, The Open Group; Edna Conway, Chief Security Officer for Global Supply Chain, Cisco; Mary Ann Mezzapelle, Americas CTO for Enterprise Security Services, HP; Jim Hietala, Vice President of Security for The Open Group, and Rance DeLong, Researcher into Security and High Assurance Systems, Santa Clara University. [Disclosure: The Open Group is a sponsor of BriefingsDirect podcasts.]

Here are some excerpts:

Dave Lounsbury: Following on from the tone that they have set about where the standards have to go and what constitutes a good standard, we have a very exciting Cybersecurity Panel on what is cybersecurity in 2015.

Lounsbury
We've heard about the security, cybersecurity landscape, and, of course, everyone knows about all the many recent breaches. Obviously, the challenge is growing in cybersecurity. So, I want to start asking a few questions, directing the first one to Edna Conway.

We've heard about the Verizon Data Breach Investigation of DBIR report that catalogs the various attacks that have been made over the past year. One of the interesting findings was that in some of these breaches, the attackers were on the networks for months before being discovered.

What do we need to start doing differently to secure our enterprises?
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Edna Conway: There are a couple of things. From my perspective, continuous monitoring is absolutely essential. People don't like it because it requires rigor, consistency, and process. The real question is, what do you continuously monitor?

It’s what you monitor that makes a difference. Access control and authentication, should absolutely be on our radar screen, but I think the real ticket is behavior. What kind of behavior do you see authorized personnel engaging in that should send up as an alert? That’s a trend that we need to embrace more.

Conway
The second thing that we need to do differently is drive detection and containment. I think we try to do that, but we need to become more rigorous in it. Some of that rigor is around things like, are we actually doing advanced malware protection, rather than just detection?

What are we doing specifically around threat analytics and the feeds that come to us: how we absorb them, how we mine them, and how we consolidate them?

The third thing for me is how we get it right. I call that team the puzzle solvers. How do we get them together swiftly?

How do you put the right group of experts together when you see a behavior aberration or you get a threat feed that says that you need to address this now? When we see a threat injection, are we actually acting on the anomaly before it makes its way further along in the cycle?

Executive support

Mary Ann Mezzapelle: Another thing that I'd like to add is making sure you have the executive support and processes in place. If you think how many plans and tests and other things that organizations have gone through for business continuity and recovery, you have to think about that incident response. We talked earlier about how to get the C suite involved. We need to have that executive sponsorship and understanding, and that means it's connected to all the other parts of the enterprise.

Mezzapelle
So it might be the communications, it might be legal, it might be other things, but knowing how to do that and being able to respond to it quickly is also very important.

Rance DeLong: I agree on the monitoring being very important as well as the question of what to monitor. There are advances being made through research in this area, both modeling behavior -- what are the nominal behaviors -- and how we can allow for certain variations in the behavior and still not have too many false positives or too many false negatives.

Also on a technical level, we can analyze systems for certain invariants, and these can be very subtle and complicated invariance formulas that may be pages long and hold on the system during its normal operation. A monitor can be monitoring both for invariance, these static things, but they can also be monitoring for changes that are supposed to occur and whether those are occurring the way they're supposed to.

Jim Hietala: The only thing I would add is that I think it’s about understanding where you really have risk and being able to measure how much risk is present in your given situation.

DeLong
In the security industry, there has been a shift in mindset away from figuring that we can actually prevent every bad thing from happening towards really understanding where people may have gotten into the system. What are those markers that something is gone awry and reacting to that in a more timely way -- so detective controls, as opposed to purely preventative type controls.

Lounsbury: We heard from Dawn Meyerriecks earlier about the convergence of virtual and physical and how that changes the risk management game. And we heard from Mary Ann Davidson about how she is definitely not going to connect her house to the Internet.

So this brings new potential risks and security management concerns. What do you see as the big Internet of Things (IoT) security concerns and how does the technology industry assess and respond to those?

Hietala: In terms of IoT, the thing that concern me is that many of the things that we've solved at some level in IT hardware, software, and systems seemed to have been forgotten by many of the IoT device manufacturers.

Hietala
We have pretty well thought out processes for how we identify assets, we patch things, and we deal with security events and vulnerabilities that happen. The idea that, particularly on the consumer class of IoT type devices, we have devices out there with IP interfaces on them, and many of the manufacturers just haven’t had a thought of how they are going to patch something in the field, I think should scare us all to some degree.

Maybe it is, as Mary Ann mentioned, the idea that there are certain systemic risks that are out there that we just have to sort of nod our head and say that that’s the way it is. But certainly around really critical kinds of IoT applications, we need to take what we've learned in the last ten years and apply it to this new class of devices.

New architectural approach

DeLong: I'd like to add to that. We need a new architectural approach for IoT that will help to mitigate the systemic risks. And echoing the concerns expressed by Mary Ann a few minutes ago, in 2014, Europol, which is an organization that tracks criminal  risks of various kinds, predicted by the end of 2014, murder by Internet, in the context of Internet of Things. It didn't happen, but they predicted it, and I think it's not farfetched that we may see it over time.

Lounsbury: What do we really know actually? Edna, do you have any reaction on that one?

Conway: Murder by Internet. That’s the question you gave me, thanks. Welcome to being a former prosecutor. The answer is on their derrieres. The reality is do we have any evidentiary reality to be able to prove that?

I think the challenge is one that's really well-taken, which is we are probably all in agreement on, the convergence of these devices. We saw the convergence of IT and OT and we haven't fixed that yet.

We are now moving with IoT into a scalability of the nature and volume of devices. To me, the real challenge will be to come up with new ways of deploying telemetry to allow us to see all the little crevices and corners of the Internet of Things, so that we can identify risks in the same way that we have. We haven't mastered 100 percent, but we've certainly tackled predominately across the computer networks and the network itself and IT. We're just not there with IoT.

Mezzapelle: Edna, it also brings to mind another thing -- we need to take advantage of the technology itself. So as the data gets democratized, meaning it's going to be everywhere -- the velocity, volume, and so forth -- we need to make sure that those devices can maybe be self-defendable, or maybe they can join together and defend themselves against other things.
The real challenge will be to come up with new ways of deploying telemetry to allow us to see all the little crevices and corners of the Internet of Things.

So we can't just apply the old-world thinking of being able to know everything and control everything, but to embed some of those kinds of characteristics in the systems, devices, and sensors themselves.

Lounsbury: We've heard about the need. In fact, Ron Ross mentioned the need for increased public-private cooperation to address the cybersecurity threat. Ron, I would urge you to think about including voluntary consensus standards organizations in that essential partnership you mentioned to make sure that you get that high level of engagement, but of course, this is a broad concern to everybody.

President Obama has made a call for legislation on enabling cybersecurity and information sharing, and one of the points within that was shaping a cyber savvy workforce and many other parts of public-private information sharing.

So what more can be done to enable effective public-private cooperation on this and what steps can we, as a consensus organization, take to actually help make that happen? Mary Ann, do you want to tackle that one and see where it goes?

Collaboration is important

Mezzapelle: To your point, collaboration is important and it's not just about the public and the private partnership. It also means within an industry sector or in your supply chain and third-party. It's not just about the technology; it's also about the processes, and being able to communicate effectively, almost at machine speed, in those areas.

So you think about the people, the processes, and the technology, I don't think it's going to be solved by government. I think I agree with the previous speakers when they were talking about how it needs to be more hand-in-hand.

There are some ways that industry can actually lead that. We have some examples, for instance what we are doing with the Healthcare Forum and with the Mining and Minerals Forum. That might seem like a little bit, but it's that little bit that helps, that brings it together to make it easier for that connection.

It's also important to think about, especially with the class of services and products that are available as a service, another measure of collaboration. Maybe you, as a security organization, determine that your capabilities can't keep up with the bad guys, because  they have more money, more time, more opportunity to take advantage, either from a financial perspective or maybe even from a competitive perspective, for your intellectual property.
You need those product vendors or you might need a services vendor to really be able to fill in the gaps, so that you can have that kind of thing on demand.

You really can't do it yourself. You need those product vendors or you might need a services vendor to really be able to fill in the gaps, so that you can have that kind of thing on demand. So I would encourage you to think about that kind of collaboration through partnerships in your whole ecosystem.

DeLong: I know that people in the commercial world don't like a lot of regulation, but I think government can provide certain minimal standards that must be met to raise the floor. Not that companies won't exceed these and use that as a competitive basis, but if minimum is set in regulations, then this will raise the whole level of discourse.

Conway: We could probably debate over a really big bottle of wine whether it's regulation or whether it's collaboration. I agree with Mary Ann. I think we need to sit down and ask what are the biggest challenges that we have and take bold, hairy steps to pull together as an industry? And that includes government and academia as partners.

But I will give you just one example: ECIDs. They are out there and some are on semiconductor devices. There are some semiconductor companies that already use them, and there are some that don't.

A simple concept would be if we could make sure that those were actually published on an access control base, so that we could go and see whether the ECID was actually utilized, number one.

Speeding up standards

Lounsbury: Okay, thanks. Jim, I think this next question is about standards evolution. So we're going to send it to someone from a standards organization.

The cyber security threat evolves quickly, and protection mechanisms evolve along with them. It's the old attacker-defender arms race. Standards take time to develop, particularly if you use a consensus process. How do we change the dynamic? How do we make sure that the standards are keeping up with the evolving threat picture? And what more can be done to speed that up and keep it fresh?

Hietala: I'll go back to a series of workshops that we did in the fall around the topic of security automation. In terms of The Open Group's perspective, standards development works best when you have a strong customer voice expressed around the pain points, requirements, and issues.

We did a series of workshops on the topic of security automation with customer organizations. We had maybe a couple of hundred inputs over the course of four workshops, three physical events, and one that we did on the web. We collected that data, and then are bringing it to the vendors and putting some context around a really critical area, which is how do you automate some of the security capabilities so that you are responding faster to attacks and threats.
Standards development works best when you have a strong customer voice expressed around the pain points, requirements, and issues.

Generally, with just the idea that we bring customers into the discussion early, we make sure that their issues are well-understood. That helps motivate the vendor community to get serious about doing things more quickly.

One of the things we heard pretty clearly in terms of requirements was that multi-vendor interoperability between security components is pretty critical in that world. It's a multi-vendor world that most of the customers are living with. So building interfaces that are open, where you have got interoperability between vendors, is a really key thing.

DeLong: It's a really challenging problem, because in emerging technologies, where you want to encourage and you depend upon innovation, it's hard to establish a standard. It's still emerging. You don't know what's going to be a good standard. So you hold off and you wait and then you start to get innovation, you get divergence, and then bringing it back together ultimately takes more energy.

Lounsbury: Rance, since you have got the microphone, how much of the current cybersecurity situation is attributed to poor blocking and tackling in terms of the basics, like doing security architecture or even having a method to do security architecture, things like risk management, which of course Jim and the Security Forum have been looking into? And not only that, what about translating that theory into operational practice and making sure that people are doing it on a regular basis?

DeLong: A report I read on SANs, a US Government issued report on January 28 of this year, said that that many, or most, or all of our critical weapons systems contain flaws and vulnerabilities. One of the main conclusions was that, in many cases, it was due to not taking care of the basics -- the proper administration of systems, the proper application of repairs, patches, vulnerability fixes, and so on. So we need to be able to do it in critical systems as well as on desktops.

Open-source crisis

Mezzapelle: You might consider the open-source code crisis that happened over the past year with Heartbleed, where the benefits of having open-source code is somewhat offset by the disadvantages.

That may be one of the areas where the basics need to be looked at. It’s also because those systems were created in an environment when the threats were at an entirely different level. That’s a reminder that we need to look to that in our own organization.

Another thing is in mobile applications, where we have such a rush to get out features, revs, and everything like that, that it’s not entirety embedded in the system’s lifecycle or in a new startup company. Those are the some of the other basic areas where we find that the basics, the foundation, needs to be solidified to really help enhance the security in those areas.

Hietala: So in the world of security, it can be a little bit opaque, when you look at a given breach, as to what really happened, what failed, and so on. But enough information has come out about some of the breaches that you get some visibility into what went wrong.
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Of the two big insider breaches -- WikiLeaks and then Snowden -- in both cases, there were fairly fundamental security controls that should have been in place, or maybe were in place, but were poorly performed, that contributed to those -- access control type things, authorization, and so on.

Even in some of the large retailer credit card breaches, you can point to the fact that they didn’t do certain things right in terms of the basic blocking and tackling.

There's a whole lot of security technology out there, a whole lot of security controls that you can look to, but implementing the right ones for your situation, given the risk that you have and then operating them effectively, is an ongoing challenge for most companies.

Mezzapelle: Can I pose a question? It’s one of my premises that sometimes compliance and regulation makes companies do things in the wrong areas to the point where they have a less secure system. What do you think about that and how that impacts the blocking and tackling?

Hietala: That has probably been true for, say, the four years preceding this, but there was a study just recently -- I couldn’t tell you who it was from -- but it basically flipped that. For the last five years or so, compliance has always been at the top of the list of drivers for information security spend in projects and so forth, but it has dropped down considerably, because of all these high profile breaches. Senior executive teams are saying, "Okay, enough. I don’t care what the compliance regulations say, we're going to do the things we need to do to secure our environment." Nobody wants to be the next Sony.

Mezzapelle: Or the Target CEO who had to step down. Even though they were compliant, they still had a breach, which unfortunately, is probably an opportunity at almost every enterprise and agency that’s out there.

The right eyeballs


DeLong: And on the subject of open source, it’s frequently given as a justification or a benefit of open source that it will be more secure because there are millions of eyeballs looking at it. It's not millions of eyeballs, but the right eyeballs looking at it, the ones who can discern that there are security problems.

It's not necessarily the case that open source is going to be more secure, because it can be viewed by millions of eyeballs. You can have proprietary software that has just as much, or more, attention from the right eyeballs as open source.

Mezzapelle: There are also those million eyeballs out there trying to make money on exploiting it before it does get patched -- the new market economy.

Lounsbury: I was just going to mention that we're now seeing that some large companies are paying those millions of eyeballs to go look for vulnerabilities, strangely enough, which they always find in other people’s code, not their own.
It's not millions of eyeballs, but the right eyeballs looking at it, the ones who can discern that there are security problems.

Mezzapelle: Our Zero Day Initiative, that was part of the business model, is to pay people to find things that we can implement into our own products first, but it also made it available to other companies and vendors so that they could fix it before it became public knowledge.

Some of the economics are changing too. They're trying to get the white hatter, so to speak, to look at other parts that are maybe more critical, like what came up with Heartbleed.

Lounsbury: On that point, and I'm going to inject a question of my own if I may, on balance, is the open sharing of information of things like vulnerability analysis helping move us forward, and can we do more of it, or do we need to channel it in other ways?

Mezzapelle: We need to do more of it. It's beneficial. We still have conclaves of secretness saying that you can give this information to this group of people, but not this group of people, and it's very hard.

In my organization, which is global, I had to look at every last little detail to say, "Can I share it with someone who is a foreigner, or someone who is in my organization, but not in my organization?" It was really hard to try to figure out how we could use that information more effectively. If we can get it more automated to where it doesn't have to be the good old network talking to someone else, or an email, or something like that, it's more beneficial.

And it's not just the vulnerabilities. It's also looking more towards threat intelligence. You see a lot of investment, if you look at the details behind some of the investments in In-Q-Tel, for instance, about looking at data in a whole different way.

So we're emphasizing data, both in analytics as well as threat prediction, being able to know where some thing is going to come over the hill and you can secure your enterprise or your applications or systems more effectively against it.

Open sharing

Lounsbury: Let’s go down the row. Edna, what are your thoughts on more open sharing?

Conway: We need to do more of it, but we need to do it in a controlled environment.

We can get ahead of the curve with not just predictive analysis, but telemetry, to feed the predictive analysis, and that’s not going to happen because a government regulation mandates that we report somewhere.

So if you look, for example, DFARS, that came out last year with regard to concerns about counterfeit mitigation and detection in COTS ICT, the reality is not everybody is a member of GIDEP, and many of us actually share our information faster than it gets into GIDEP and more comprehensively.

I will go back to it’s rigor in the industry and sharing in a controlled environment.
There is a whole black market that has developed around those things, where nations are to some degree hoarding them, paying a lot of money to get them, to use them in cyberwar type activities.

Lounsbury: Jim, thoughts on open sharing?

Hietala: Good idea. It gets a little murky when you're looking at zero-day vulnerabilities. There is a whole black market that has developed around those things, where nations are to some degree hoarding them, paying a lot of money to get them, to use them in cyberwar type activities.

There's a great book out now called ‘Zero Day’ by Kim Zetter, a writer from Wired. It gets into the history of Stuxnet and how it was discovered, and Symantec, and I forget the other security researcher firm that found it. There were a number of zero-day vulnerabilities there that were used in an offensive cyberwar a capacity. So it’s definitely a gray area at this point.

DeLong: I agree with what Edna said about the parameters of the controlled environment, the controlled way in which it's done. Without naming any names, recently there were some feathers flying over a security research organization establishing some practices concerning a 60- or 90-day timeframe, in which they would notify a vendor of vulnerabilities, giving them an opportunity to issue a patch. In one instance recently, when that time expired and they released it, the vendor was rather upset because the patch had not been issued yet. So what are reasonable parameters of this controlled environment?

Supply chains

Lounsbury: Let’s move on here. Edna, one of the great quotes that came out of the early days of OTTF was that only God creates something from nothing and everybody else is on somebody’s supply chain. I love that quote.

But given that all IT components, or all IT products, are built from hardware and software components, which are sourced globally, what do we do to mitigate the specific risks resulting from malware and counterfeit parts being inserted in the supply chain? How do you make sure that the work to do that is reflected in creating preference for vendors who put that effort into it?

Conway: It's probably three-dimensional. The first part is understanding what your problem is. If you go back to what we heard Mary Ann Davidson talk about earlier today, the reality is what is the problem you're trying to solve?

I'll just use the Trusted Technology Provider Standard as an example of that. Narrowing down what the problem is, where the problem is located, helps you, number one.
We have a tendency to think about cyber in isolation from the physical, and the physical in isolation from the cyber, and then the logical.

Then, you have to attack it from all dimensions. We have a tendency to think about cyber in isolation from the physical, and the physical in isolation from the cyber, and then the logical. For those of us who live in OT or supply chain, we have to have processes that drive this. If those three don't converge and map together, we'll fail, because there will be gaps, inevitable gaps.

For me, it's identifying what your true problem is and then taking a three-dimensional approach to make sure that you always have security technology, the combination of the physical security, and then the logical processes to interlock and try to drive a mitigation scheme that will never reduce you to zero, but will identify things.

Particularly think about IoT in a manufacturing environment with the right sensor at the right time and telemetry around human behavior. All of a sudden, you're going to know things before they get to a stage in that supply chain or product lifecycle where they can become devastating in their scope of problem.

DeLong: As one data point, there was a lot of concern over chips fabricated in various parts of the world being used in national security systems. And in 2008, DARPA initiated a program called TRUST, which had a very challenging objective for coming up with methods by which these chips could be validated after manufacture.

Just as one example of the outcome of that, under the IRIS Program in 2010, SRI unveiled an infrared laser microscope that could examine the chips at the nanometer level, both for construction, functionality, and their likely lifetime -- how long they would last before they failed.

Lounsbury: Jim, Mary Ann, reactions?

Finding the real problem

Mezzapelle: The only other thing I wanted to add to Edna’s comment was reiteration about the economics of it and finding where the real problem is. Especially in the security area, information technology security, we tend to get so focused on trying to make it technically pure, avoiding the most 100 percent, ultimate risk. Sometimes, we forget to put our business ears on and think about what that really means for the business? Is it keeping them from innovating quickly, adapting to new markets, perhaps getting into a new global environment?

We have to make sure we look back at the business imperatives and make sure that we have metrics all along the road that help us make sure we are putting the investments in the right area, because security is really a risk balance, which I know Jim has a whole lot more to talk about.

Hietala: The one thing I would add to this conversation is that we have sort of been on a journey to where doing a better job of security is a good thing. The question is when is it going to become a differentiator for your product and service in the market. For me personally, a bank that really gets online banking and security right is a differentiator to me as a consumer.
Consumers -- and they surveyed consumers in 27 countries -- think that governments and businesses are not paying enough attention to digital security.

I saw a study that was quoted this week at the World Economic Forum that said that, by 2:1 margin, consumers -- and they surveyed consumers in 27 countries -- think that governments and businesses are not paying enough attention to digital security.

So maybe that’s a mindset shift that’s occurring as a result of how bad cybersecurity has been. Maybe we'll get to the point soon where it can be a differentiator for companies in the business-to-business context and a business-to-consumer context and so forth. So we can hope.

Conway: Great point. And just to pivot on that and point out how important it is. I know that what we are seeing now, and it’s a trend, and there are some cutting-edge folks who have been doing it for a while, but most boards of directors are looking at creating a digital advisory board for their company. They're recognizing the pervasiveness of digital risk as its own risk that sometimes it reports up to the audit committee.

I've seen at least 20 or 30 in the last three months come around, asking, did you advise every board members to focus on this from multiple disciplines? If we get that right, it might allow us that opportunity to share the information more broadly.

Lounsbury: That’s a really interesting point, the point about multiple disciplines. The next question is unfortunately the final question -- or fortunately, since it will get you to lunch. I am going to start off with Rance.

At some point, the difference between a security vulnerability failure or other kind of failures all flow into that big risk analysis that a digital-risk management regime would find out. One of the things that’s going on across the Real-Time and Embedded Systems Forum is to look at how we architect systems for higher levels of assurance, not just security vulnerabilities, but other kinds of failures as well.

The question I will ask here is, if a system fails its service-level agreement (SLA) for whatever reason, whether it’s security or some other kind of vulnerability, is that a result of our ability to do system architecture or software created without provably secure or provably assured components or the ability of the system to react to those kind of failures? If you believe that, how do we change it? How do we accelerate the adoption of better practices in order to mitigate the whole spectrum of risk of failure of the digital enterprise?

Emphasis on protection

DeLong: Well, in high assurance systems, obviously we still treat them as very important detection of problems when they occur, recovery from problems, but we put a greater emphasis on prevention, and we try to put greater effort into prevention.

You mentioned provably secure components, but provable security is only part of the picture. When you do prove, you prove a theorem, and in a reasonable system, a system of reasonable complexity, there isn’t just one theorem. There are tens, hundreds, or even thousands of theorems that are proved to establish certain properties in the system.

It has to do with proofs of the various parts, proofs of how the parts combine, what are the claims we want to make for the system, how do the proofs provide evidence that the claims are justified, and what kind of argumentation do we use based on that set of evidence.

So we're looking at not just the proofs as little gems, if you will. A proof of a theorem  think of it as a gemstone, but how are they all combined into creating a system?

If a movie star walked out on the red carpet with a little burlap sack around her neck full of a handful of gemstones, we wouldn’t be as impressed as we are when we see a beautiful necklace that’s been done by a real master, who has taken tens or hundreds of stones and combined them in a very pleasing and beautiful way.

And so we have to put as much attention, not just on the individual gemstones, which admittedly are created with very pure materials and under great pressure, but also how they are combined into a work that meets the purpose.

And so we have assurance cases, we have compositional reasoning, and other things that have to come into play. It’s not just about the provable components and it’s a mistake that is sometimes made to just focus on the proof.
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Remember, proof is really just a degree of demonstration, and we always want some demonstration to have confidence in the system, and proof is just an extreme degree of demonstration.

Mezzapelle: I think I would summarize it by embedding security early and often, and don’t depend on it 100 percent. That means you have to make your systems, your processes and your people resilient.

This has been a BriefingsDirect panel discussion overview from The Open Group Conference in San Diego on Feb. 2 through 5, 2015.

The panel, which examined issues and improvements for global enterprise cybersecurity, consisted of moderator Dave Lounsbury, Chief Technology Officer, The Open Group; Edna Conway, Chief Security Officer for Global Supply Chain, Cisco; Mary Ann Mezzapelle, Americas CTO for Enterprise Security Services, HP; Jim Hietala, Vice President of Security for The Open Group, and Rance DeLong, Researcher into Security and High Assurance Systems, Santa Clara University.

This has been a special BriefingsDirect presentation and panel discussion from The Open Group San Diego 2015. Download a copy of the transcript. This follows an earlier discussion on cybersecurity standards for safer supply chains. Another earlier discussion from the event focused on synergies among major Enterprise Architecture frameworks. And a presentation by John Zachman, founder of the Zachman Framework.

Transcript of a live panel discussion at February's The Open Group San Diego 2015. Copyright  The Open Group and Interarbor Solutions, LLC, 2005-2015. All rights reserved.

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Tuesday, March 10, 2015

Cybersecurity Standards: The Open Group Explores Security and Safer Supply Chains

Transcript of a live panel discussion at last month's The Open Group San Diego 2015.

Welcome to a special BriefingsDirect presentation and panel discussion from The Open Group San Diego 2015, which ran Feb. 2 through Feb. 5. Download a copy of the transcript. This follows an earlier discussion from the event on synergies among major Enterprise Architecture frameworks with The Open Group.

The latest discussion, examining the both need and outlook for Cybersecurity standards among supply chains, is moderated by Dave Lounsbury, Chief Technology Officer, The Open Group; with guests Mary Ann Davidson, Chief Security Officer, Oracle; Dr. Ron Ross, Fellow of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Jim Hietala, Vice President of Security for The Open Group. [Disclosure: The Open Group is a sponsor of BriefingsDirect podcasts.]

Here are some excerpts:

Dave Lounsbury: Mary Ann Davidson is responsible for Oracle Software Security Assurance and represents Oracle on the Board of Directors for the Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and on the international Board of the ISSA.

Lounsbury
Dr. Ron Ross leads the Federal Information Security Management Act Implementation Project. It sounds like a big job to fulfill, developing the security standards and guidelines for the federal government.

This session is going to look at the cybersecurity and supply chain landscape from a standards perspective. So Ron and Mary Ann, thank you very much.

Ron Ross: All of us are part of the technology explosion and revolution that we have been experiencing for the last couple of decades.

I would like to have you leave today with a couple of major points, at least from my presentation, things that we have observed in cybersecurity for the last 25 years: where we are today and where I think we might need to go in the future. There is no right or wrong answer to this problem of cybersecurity. It’s probably one of the most difficult and challenging sets of problems we could ever experience.

Ross
In our great country, we work on what I call the essential partnership. It's a combination of government, industry, and academia all working together. We have the greatest technology producers, not just in this country, but around the world, who are producing some fantastic things to which we are all "addicted." I think we have an addiction to the technology.

Some of the problems we're going to experience going forward in cybersecurity aren't just going to be technology problems. They're going to be cultural problems and organizational problems. The key issue is how we organize ourselves, what our risk tolerance is, how we are going to be able to accomplish all of our critical missions and business operations that Dawn talked about this morning, and do so in a world that's fairly dangerous. We have to protect ourselves.

Movie app

I think I can sum it up. I was at a movie. I don’t go to movies very often anymore, but about a month ago, I went to a movie. I was sitting there waiting for the main movie to start, and they were going through all the coming attractions. Then they came on the PA and they said that there is an app you can download. I'm not sure you have ever seen this before, but it tells you for that particular movie when is the optimal time to go to the restroom during the movie.

I bring this up because that's a metaphor for where we are today. We are consumed. There are great companies out there, producing great technologies. We're buying it up faster than you can shake a stick at it, and we are developing the most complicated IT infrastructure ever.

So when I look at this problem, I look at this from a scientist’s point of view, an engineering point of view. I'm saying to myself, knowing what I know about what it takes  to -- I don't even use the word "secure" anymore, because I don’t think we can ever get there with the current complexity -- build the most secure systems we can and be able to manage risk in the world that we live in.

In the army, we used to have a saying. You go to war with the army that you have, not the army that you want. We’ve heard about all the technology advances, and we're going to be buying stuff, commercial stuff, and we're going to have to put it together into systems. Whether it’s the Internet of Things (IoT) or cyber-physical convergence, it all goes back to some fairly simple things.

http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/press/executives/016331.htm
Davidson
The IoT and all this stuff that we're talking about today really gets back to computers. That’s the common denominator. They're everywhere. This morning, we talked about your automobile having more compute power than Apollo 11. In your toaster, your refrigerator, your building, the control of the temperature, industrial control systems in power plants, manufacturing plants, financial institutions, the common denominator is the computer, driven by firmware and software.

When you look at the complexity of the things that we're building today, we've gone past the time when we can actually understand what we have and how to secure it.

That's one of the things that we're going to do at NIST this year and beyond. We've been working in the FISMA world forever it seems, and we have a whole set of standards, and that's the theme of today: how can standards help you build a more secure enterprise?

The answer is that we have tons of standards out there and we have lots of stuff, whether it's on the federal side with 853 or the Risk Management Framework, or all the great things that are going on in the standards world, with The Open Group, or ISO, pick your favorite standard.

Hietala
The real question is how we use those standards effectively to change the current outlook and what we are experiencing today because of this complexity? The adversary has a significant advantage in this world, because of complexity. They really can pick the time, the place, and the type of attack, because the attack surface is so large when you talk about not just the individual products.

We have many great companies just in this country and around the world that are doing a lot to make those products more secure. But then they get into the engineering process and put them together in a system, and that really is an unsolved problem. We call it a Composability Problem. I can have a trusted product here and one here, but what is the combination of those two when you put them together in the systems context? We haven’t solved that problem yet, and it’s getting more complicated everyday.

Continuous monitoring

For the hard problems, we in the federal government do a lot of stuff in continuous monitoring. We're going around counting our boxes and we are patching stuff and we are configuring our components. That's loosely called cyber hygiene. It’s very important to be able to do all that and do it quickly and efficiently to make your systems as secure as they need to be.

But even the security controls in our control catalog, 853, when you get into the technical controls --  I'm talking about access control mechanisms, identification, authentication, encryption, and audit -- those things are buried in the hardware, the software, the firmware, and the applications.

Most of our federal customers can’t even see those. So when I ask them if they have all their access controls in place, they can nod their head yes, but they can’t really prove that in a meaningful way.

So we have to rely on industry to make sure those mechanisms, those functions, are employed within the component products that we then will put together using some engineering process.
So we have to rely on industry to make sure those mechanisms, those functions, are employed within the component products that we then will put together using some engineering process.

This is the below-the-waterline problem I talk about. We're in some kind of digital denial today, because below the water line, most consumers are looking at their smartphones, their tablets, and all their apps -- that’s why I used that movie example -- and they're not really thinking about those vulnerabilities, because they can't see them, until it affects them personally.

I had to get three new credit cards last year. I shop at Home Depot and Target, and JPMorgan Chase is our federal credit card. That’s not a pain point for me because I'm indemnified. Even if there are fraudulent charges, I don't get hit for those.

If your identity is stolen, that’s a personal pain point. We haven't reached that national pain point yet. All of the security stuff that we do we talk about it a lot and we do a lot of it, but if you really want to effect change, you're going to start to hear more at this conference about assurance, trustworthiness, and resiliency. That's the world that we want to build and we are not there today.

That's the essence of where I am hoping we are going to go. It's these three areas: software assurance, systems security engineering, and supply-chain risk management.

My colleague Jon Boyens is here today and he is the author, along with a very talented team of coauthors, of the NIST 800-161 document. That's the supply chain risk document.

It’s going to work hand-in-hand with another publication that we're still working on, the 800-160 document. We are taking an IEEE and an ISO standard, 15288, and we're trying to infuse into that standard. They are coming out with the update of that standard this year. We're trying to infuse security into every step of the lifecycle.

Wrong reasons

The reason why we are not having a lot of success on the cybersecurity front today is because security ends up appearing either too late or by the wrong people for the wrong reasons.

I'll give you one example. In the federal government, we have a huge catalog of security controls, and they are allocated into different baselines: low, moderate, and high. So you will pick a baseline, you will tailor, and you'll come to the system owner or the authorizing official and say, "These are all the controls that NIST says we have to do." Well, the mission business owner was never involved in that discussion.

One of the things we are going to do with the new document is focus on the software and systems engineering process from the start of the stakeholders, all the way through requirements, analysis, definition, design, development, implementation, operation, and sustainment, all the way to disposal. Critical things are going to happen at every one of those places in the lifecycle

The beauty of that process is that you involve the stakeholders early. So when those security controls are actually selected they can be traced back to a specific security requirement, which is part of a larger set of requirements that support that mission or business operation, and now you have the stakeholders involved in the process.

Up to this point in time, security operates in its own vacuum. It’s in the little office down the hall, and we go down there whenever there's a problem. But unless and until security gets integrated and we disappear as being our own discipline, we now are part of the Enterprise Architecture, whether it’s TOGAF® or whatever architecture construct you are following, or the systems engineering process. The system development lifecycle is the third one, and people ask what is acquisition and procurement.
Unless we have our stakeholders at those tables to influence, we are going to continue to deploy systems that are largely indefensible not against all cyber attacks but against the high-end attacks.

Unless we have our stakeholders at those tables to influence, we are going to continue to deploy systems that are largely indefensible not against all cyber attacks but against the high-end attacks.

We have to do a better job getting at the C-Suite and I tried to capture the five essential areas that this discussion has to revolve around. The acronym is TACIT, and it just happens to be a happy coincidence that it fit into an acronym. But it's basically looking at the threat, how you configure your assets, and how you categorize your assets with regard to criticality.

How complex is the system you're building? Are you managing that complexity in trying to reduce it, integrating security across the entire set of business practices within the organization? Then, the last component, which really ties into The Open Group, and the things you're doing here with all the projects that were described in the first session, that is the trustworthiness piece.

Are we building products and systems that are, number one, more penetration resistance to cyber attacks; and number two, since we know we can't stop all attacks, because we can never reduce complexity to where we thought we could two or three decades ago. Are we building the essential resiliency into that system. Even when the adversary comes to the boundary and the malware starts to work, how far does it spread, and what can it do?

That's the key question. You try to limit the time on target for the advisory, and that can be done very, very easily with good architectural and good engineering solutions. That's my message for 2015 and beyond, at least from a lot of things at NIST. We're going to start focusing on the architecture and the engineering, how to really affect things at the ground level?

Processes are important

Now we always will have the people, the processes, the technologies kind of this whole ecosystem that we have to deal with, and you're going to always have to worry about your sys admins that go bad and dump all the stuff that you don't want dumped on the Internet. But that's part of system process. Processes are very important because they give us structure, discipline, and the ability to communicate with our partners.

I was talking to Rob Martin from Mitre. He's working on a lot of important projects there with the CWEs, CVEs. It gives you the ability to communicate a level of trustworthiness and assurance that other people can have that dialogue, because without that, we're not going to be communicating with each other. We're not going to trust each other, and that's critical, having that common understanding. Frameworks provide that common dialogue of security controls in a common process, how we build things, and what is the level of risk that we are willing to accept in that whole process.

These slides, and they’ll be available, go very briefly into the five areas. Understanding the modern threat today is critical because, even if you don't have access to classified threat data, there's a lot of great data out there with Symantec and Verizon reports, and there's open-source threat information available.

If you haven't had a chance to do that, I know the folks who work on the high assurance stuff in The Open Group RT&ES. look at that stuff a lot, because they're building a capability that is intended to stop some of those types of threats.

The other thing about assets is that we don't do a very good job of criticality analysis. In other words, most of our systems are running, processing, storing, and transmitting data and we’re not segregating the critical data into its own domain where necessary.
Complexity is something that’s going to be very difficult to address because of our penchant for bringing in new technologies.

I know that's hard to do sometimes. People say, “I’ve got to have all this stuff ready to go 24×7,” but when you look at some of the really bad breaches that we have had over the last several years establishing a domain for critical data, where that domain can be less complex, which means you can better defend it, and then you can invest more resources into defending those things that are the most critical.

I used a very simple example of a safe deposit box. I can't get all my stuff into the safe deposit box. So I have to make decisions. I put important papers in there, maybe a coin collection, whatever.  I have locks on my house on the front door, but they're not strong enough to stop some of those bad guys out there. So I make those decisions. I put it in the bank, and it goes in a vault. It’s a pain in the butt to go down there and get the stuff out, but it gives me more assurance, greater trustworthiness. That's an example of the things we have to be able to do.

Complexity is something that’s going to be very difficult to address because of our penchant for bringing in new technologies. Make no mistake about it, these are great technologies. They are compelling. They are making us more efficient. They are allowing us to do things we never imagined, like finding out the optimal time to go to the restroom during a movie, I mean who could have imagined we could do that a decade ago.

But as with every one of our customers out there, the kinds of things we’re talking about flies below their radar. When you download 100 apps on your smartphone, people in general, even the good folks in cybersecurity, have no idea where those apps are coming from, where the pedigree is, have they been tested at all, have they been evaluated, are they running on a trusted operating system?

Ultimately, that's what this business is all about, and that's what 800-161 is all about. It's about a lifecycle of the entire stack from applications, to middleware, to operating systems, to firmware, to integrated circuits, to include the supply chain.

The adversary is all over that stack. They now figure out how to compromise our firmware so we have to come up with firmware integrity controls in our control catalog, and that's the world we live in today.

Managing complexity

I was smiling this morning when I talked about the DNI, the Director of National Intelligence in building their cloud, if that’s going to go to the public cloud or not. I think Dawn is probably right, you probably won’t see that going to the public cloud anytime soon, but cloud computing gives us an opportunity to manage complexity. You can figure out what you want to send to the public cloud.

They do a good job through the FedRAMP program of deploying controls and they’ve got a business model that's important to make sure they protect their customers’ assets. So that's built into their business model and they do a lot of great things out there to try to protect that information.

Then, for whatever stays behind in your enterprise, you can start to employ some of the architectural constructs that you'll see here at this conference, some of the security engineering constructs that we’re going to talk about in 800-160, and you can better defend what stays behind within your organization.

So cloud is a way to reduce that complexity. Enterprise Architecture, TOGAF, all of those architectural things allow you to provide discipline and structure and thinking about what you're building: how to protect it, how much it’s going to cost and is it worth it? That is the essence of good security. It’s not about running around with a barrel full of security controls or ISO 27000 saying, hey, you’ve got to do all this stuff, or this guy is going to fall, those days are over.

Integration we talked about. This is also hard. We are working with stovepipes today. Enterprise Architects typically don't talk to security people. Acquisition folks, in most cases, don't talk to security people.
The message I'm going to send everyday is that we have to be more informed consumers. We have to ask for things that we know we need.

I see it everyday. You see RFPs go out and there is a whole long list of requirements, and then, when it comes to security, they say the system or the product they are buying must be FISMA compliant. They know that’s a law and they know they have to do that, but they really don't give the industry or the potential contractors any specificity as to what they need to do to bring that product or the system to the state where it needs to be.

And so it's all about expectations. I believe our industry, whether it's here or overseas, wherever these great companies operate, the one thing we can be sure of is that they want to please their customers. So maybe what the message I'm going to send everyday is that we have to be more informed consumers. We have to ask for things that we know we need.

It’s like if you go back with the automobile. When I first started driving a long time ago,  40 years ago, cars just had seatbelts. There were no airbags and no steel-reinforced doors. Then, you could actually buy an airbag as an option at some point. When you fast-forward to today, every car has an airbag, seatbelt, steel-reinforced doors. It comes as part of the basic product. We don't have to ask for it, but as consumers we know it's there, and it's important to us.

We have to start to look at the IT business in the same way, just like when we cross a bridge or fly in an airplane. All of you who flew here in airplanes and came across bridges had confidence in those structures. Why? Because they are built with good scientific and engineering practices.

So least functionality, least privilege, those are kind of foundational concepts in our world and cybersecurity. You really can't look at a smartphone or a tablet and talk about least functionality anymore, at least if you are running that movie app, and you want to have all of that capability.

The last point about trustworthiness is that we have four decades of best practices in trusted systems development. It failed 30 years ago because we had the vision back then of trusted operating systems, but the technology and the development far outstripped our ability to actually achieve that.

Increasingly difficult

We talked about a kernel-based operating system having 2,000, 3,000, 4,000, 5,000 lines of code and being highly trusted. Well, those concepts are still in place. It’s just that now the operating systems are 50 million lines of code, and so it becomes increasingly difficult.

And this is the key thing. As a society, we're going to have to figure out, going forward, with all this great technology, what kind of world do we want to have for ourselves and our grandchildren? Because with all this technology, as good as it is, if we can’t provide a basis of security and privacy that customers can feel comfortable with, then at some point this party is going to stop.

I don't know when that time is going to come, but I call it the national pain point in this digital denial. We will come to that steady state. We just haven't had enough time yet to get to that balance point, but I'm sure we will.

I talked about the essential partnership, but I don't think we can solve any problem without a collaborative approach, and that's why I use the essential partnership: government, industry, and academia.
But the bottom line is that we have to work together, and I believe that we'll do that.

Certainly all of the innovation, or most of the innovation, comes from our great industry. Academia is critical, because the companies like Oracle or Microsoft want to hire students who have been educated in what I call the STEM disciplines: Science, Technology, Engineering -- whether it's "double e" or computer science -- and Mathematics. They need those folks to be able to build the kind of products that have the capabilities, function-wise, and also are trusted.

And government plays some role -- maybe some leadership, maybe a bully pulpit, cheerleading where we can -- bringing things together. But the bottom line is that we have to work together, and I believe that we'll do that. And when that happens I think all of us will be able to sit in that movie and fire up that app about the restroom and feel good that it's secure.

Mary Ann Davidson: I guess I'm preaching to the converted, if I can use a religious example without offending somebody. One of the questions you asked is, why do we even have standards in this area? And of course some of them are for technical reasons. Crypto it turns out is easy for even very smart people to get wrong. Unfortunately, we have reason to find out.

So there is technical correctness. Another reason would be interoperability to get things to work better in a more secure manner. I've worked in this industry long enough to remember the first SSL implementation, woo-hoo, and then it turns out 40 bits wasn't really 40, bits because it wasn’t random enough, shall we say.

Trustworthiness. ISO has a standard -- The Common Criteria. It’s an ISO standard. We talk about what does it mean to have secure software, what type of threats does it address, how do you prove that it does what you say you do? There are standards for that, which helps. It helps everybody. It certainly helps buyers understand a little bit more about what they're getting.

No best practices

And last, but not least, and the reason it’s in quotes, “best practices,” is because there actually are no best practices. Why do I say that -- and I am seeing furrowed brows back there? First of all, lawyers don't like them in contracts, because then if you are not doing the exact thing, you get sued.

There are good practices and there are worst practices. There typically isn't one thing that everyone can do exactly the same way that's going to be the best practice. So that's why that’s in quotation marks.

Generally speaking, I do think standards, particularly in general, can be a force for good in the universe, particularly in cybersecurity, but they are not always a force for good, depending on other factors.

And what is the ecosystem? Well, we have a lot of people. We have standards makers, people who work on them. Some of them are people who review things. Like when NIST is very good, which I appreciate, about putting drafts out and taking comments, as opposed to saying, "Here it is, take it or leave it." That’s actually a very constructive dialogue, which I believe a lot of people appreciate. I know that I do.

Sometimes there are mandators. You'll get an RFP that says, "Verily, thou shall comply with this, less thee be an infidel in the security realm." And that can be positive. It can  be a leading edge of getting people to do something good that, in many cases, they should do anyway.
You get better products in something that is not a monopoly market. Competition is good.

Implementers, who have to take this and decipher and figure out why they are doing it. People who make sure that you actually did what you said you were going to do.

And last, but not least, there are weaponizers. What do I mean by that? We all know who they are. They are people who will try to develop a standard and then get it mandated. Actually, it isn’t a standard. It’s something they came up with, which might be very good, but it’s handing them regulatory capture.

And we need to be aware of those people. I like the Oracle database. I have to say that, right? There are a lot of other good databases out there. If I went in and said, purely objectively speaking, everybody should standardize on the Oracle database, because it’s the most secure. Well, nice work if I can get it.

Is that in everybody else’s interest? Probably not. You get better products in something that is not a monopoly market. Competition is good.

So I have an MBA, or had one in a prior life, and they used to talk in the marketing class about the three Ps of marketing. Don’t know what they are anymore; it's been a while. So I thought I would come up with Four Ps of a Benevolent Standard, which are Problem Statement, Precise Language, Pragmatic Solutions, and Prescriptive Minimization.

Economic analysis

And the reason I say this is one of the kind of discussions I have to have a lot of times, particularly sometimes with people in the government. I'm not saying this in any pejorative way. So please don't take it that way. It's the importance of economic analysis, because nobody can do everything.

So being able to say that I can't boil the ocean, because you are going to boil everything else in it, but I can do these things. If I could do these things, it’s very clear what I am trying to do. It’s very clear what the benefit is. We've analyzed it, and it's probably something everybody can do. Then, we can get to better.

Better is better than omnibus. Omnibus is something everybody gets thrown under if you make something too big. Sorry, I had to say that.

So Problem Statement: why is this important? You would think it’s obvious, Mary Ann, except that it isn't, because so often the discussions I have with people, tell me what problem you are worried about? What are you trying to accomplish? If you don't tell me that, then we're going to be all over the map. You say potato and I say "potahto," and the chorus of that song is, "let’s call the whole thing off."
Buying a crappy product is a risk of doing business. It’s not, per se, a supply chain risk.

I use supply chain as an example, because this one is all over the map. Bad quality? Well, buying a crappy product is a risk of doing business. It’s not, per se, a supply chain risk. I'm not saying it’s not important, but it it’s certainly not a cyber-specific supply chain risk.

Bad security: well, that's important, but again, that’s a business risk.

Backdoor bogeyman: this is the popular one. How do I know you didn’t put a backdoor in there? Well, you can't actually, and that’s not a solvable problem.

Assurance, supply chain shutdown: yeah, I would like to know that a critical parts supplier isn’t going to go out of business. So these are all important, but they are all different problems.

So if you don't say what you're worried about, and it can't be all the above. Almost every business has some supplier of some sort, even if it’s just healthcare. If you're not careful how you define this, you will be trying to define a 100 percent of any entity's business operations. And that's not appropriate.

Use cases are really important, because you may have a Problem Statement. I'll give you one, and this is not to ding NIST in any way, shape, or form, but I just read this. It’s the Cryptographic Key Management System draft. The only reason I cite this as an example is that I couldn't actually find a use case in there.

So whatever the merits of that are saying, are you trying to develop a super secret key management system for government, very sensitive cryptographic things you are building from scratch, or you are trying to define a key management system that we have to use for things like TLS or any encryption that any commercial product does, because that's way out of scope?

So without that, what are you worried about? And also what’s going to happen is somebody is going to cite this in an RFP and it’s going to be, are you compliant with bladdy-blah? And you have no idea whether that even should apply.

Problem Statement

So that Problem Statement is really important, because without that, you can't have that dialogue in groups like this. Well, what are we trying to accomplish? What are we worried about? What are the worst problems to solve?

Precise Language is also very important. Why? Because it turns out everybody speaks a slightly different language, even if we all speak some dialect of geek, and that is, for example, a vulnerability.

If you say vulnerability to my vulnerability handling team, they think of that as a security vulnerability that’s caused by a defect in software.

But I've seen it used to include, well, you didn’t configure the product properly. I don’t know what that is, but it’s not a vulnerability, at least not to a vendor. You implemented a policy incorrectly. It might lead to vulnerability, but it isn’t one. So you are seeing where I am going with this. If you don’t have language to find very crisply the same thing, you read something and you go off and do it and you realize you solved the wrong problem.

I am very fortunate. One of my colleagues from Oracle, who works on our hardware, and I also saw a presentation by people in that group at the Cryptographic Conference in November. They talked about how much trouble we got into because if you say, "module" to a hardware person, it’s a very different thing from what it meant to somebody trying to certify it. This is a huge problem because again you say, potato, I say "potahto." It’s not the same thing to everybody. So it needs to be very precisely defined.
Everybody speaks a slightly different language, even if we all speak some dialect of geek, and that is, for example, a vulnerability.

Scope is also important. I don’t know why. I have to say this a lot and it does get kind of tiresome, I am sure to the recipients, COTS isn't GOTS. Commercial software is not government software, and it’s actually globally developed. That’s the only way you get commercial software, the feature rich, reads frequently. We have access to global talent.

It’s not designed for all threat environments. It can certainly be better, and I think most people are moving towards better software, most likely because we're getting beaten up by hackers and then our customers, and it’s good business. But there is no commercial market for high-assurance software or hardware, and that’s really important, because there is only so much that you can do to move the market.

So even a standards developer or big U.S. governments, is an important customer in the market for a lot of people, but they're not big enough to move the marketplace on their own, and so you are limited by the business dynamic.

So that's important, you can get to better. I tell people, "Okay, anybody here have a Volkswagen? Okay, is it an MRAP vehicle? No, it’s not, is it? You bought a Volkswagen and you got a Volkswagen. You can’t take a Volkswagen and drive it around streets and expect it to perform like an MRAP vehicle. Even a system integrator, a good one, cannot sprinkle pixie dust over that Volkswagen and turn it into an MRAP vehicle. Those are very different threat environments.

Why you think commercial software and hardware is different? It’s not different. It’s exactly the same thing. You might have a really good Volkswagen, and it’s great for commuting, but it is never going to perform in an IED environment. It wasn’t designed for that, and there is nothing you can do or make it designed to perform in that environment.

Pragmatism

Pragmatism; I really wish anybody working on any standard would do some economic analysis, because economics rules the world. Even if it’s something really good, a really good idea, time, money, and people, particularly qualified security people, are constrained resourses.

So if you make people do something that looks good on paper, but it’s really time-consuming, it’s an opportunity, the cost is too high. That means what is the value of something you could do with those resources that would either cost less or deliver higher benefit. And if you don’t do that analysis, then you have people say, "Hey, that’s a great idea. Wow, that’s great too. I’d like that." It’s like asking your kid, "Do you want candy. Do want new toys? Do want more footballs?" Instead of saying, "Hey, you have 50 bucks, what you are going to do with it?"

And then there are unintended consequences, because if you make this too complex, you just have fewer suppliers. People will never say, "I'm just not going to bid because it’s impossible." I'm going to give you three examples and again I'm trying to be respectful here. This is not to dis anybody who worked on these. In some cases, these things have been subsequent revisions that have been modified, which I really appreciate. But there are examples of, when you think about it, what were you asking for in the first place.
I really wish anybody working on any standard would do some economic analysis, because economics rules the world.

I think this was an early version of NISTR 7622 and has since been excised. There was a requirement that the purchaser wanted to be notified of personnel changes involving maintenance. Okay, what does that mean?

I know what I think they wanted, which is, if you are outsourcing the human resources for the Defense Department and you move the whole thing to "Hackistan," obviously they would want to be notified. I got that, but that’s not what it said.

So I look at that and say, we have 5,000 products, at least, at Oracle. We have billions and billions of lines of code everyday. Somebody checks out a transaction, getting some code, and they do some work on it and they didn’t write it in the first place.

So am I going to tweet all that to somebody. What’s that going to do for you? Plus you have things like the German Workers Council. We are going to tell the US Government that Jurgen worked on this line of code. Oh no, that’s not going to happen.

So what was it you were worried about, because that is not sustainable, tweeting people 10,000 times a day with code changes is just going to consume a lot of resource.

In another one, had this in an early version of something they were trying to do. They wanted to know, for each phase of development for each project, how many foreigners worked on it? What's a foreigner? Is it a Green Card holder? Is it someone who has a dual passport? What is that going to do for you?

Now again if you had a super custom code for some intelligence, I can understand there might be cases in which that would matter. But general-purpose software is not one of them. As I said, I can give you that information. We're a big company and we’ve got lots of resource. A smaller company probably can’t. Again, what will I do for you, because I am taking resources I could be using on something much more valuable and putting them on something really silly.

Last, but not least, and again, with respect, I think I know why this was in there. It might have been the secure engineering draft standard that you came up with that has many good parts to it.

Root cause analysis

I think vendors will probably understand this pretty quickly. Root Cause Analysis. If you have a vulnerability, one of the first things you should use is Root Cause Analysis. If you're a vendor and you have a CVSS 10 Security vulnerability in a product that’s being exploited, what do you think the first thing you are going to do is?

Get a patch in your customers’ hands or work around? Yeah, probably, that’s probably the number one priority. Also, Root Cause Analysis, particularly for really nasty security bugs, is really important. CVSS 0, who cares? But for 9 or 10, you should be doing that common analysis.

I’ve got a better one. We have a technology we have called Java. Maybe you’ve heard of it. We put a lot of work into fixing Java. One of the things we did is not only Root Cause Analysis, for CVSS 9 and higher. They have to go in front of my boss. Every Java developer had to sit through that briefing. How did this happen?

Last but not least, looking for other similar instances, not just root cause, how did that get in there and how do we avoid it. Where else does this problem exist. I am not saying this to make us look good; I 'm saying for the analytics. What are you really trying to solve here. Root Cause Analysis is important, but it's important in context. If I have to do it for everything, it's probably not the best use of a scarce resource.
If you mandate too much, it will stifle innovation and it won’t work for people.

My last point is to minimize prescriptiveness within limits. For example, probably some people in here don’t know how to bake or maybe you made a pie. There is no one right way to bake a cherry pie. Some people go down to Ralphs and they get a frozen Marie Callendar’s out of the freezer, they stick it in the oven, and they’ve got a pretty good cherry pie.

Some people make everything from scratch. Some people use a prepared pie crust and they do something special with the cherries they picked off their tree, but there is no one way to do that that is going to work for everybody.

Best practice for something. For example, I can say truthfully that a best development practice would not be just start coding, number one; and number two, it compiles without too many errors on the base platform, and ship it. That is not good development practice.

If you mandate too much, it will stifle innovation and it won’t work for people. Plus, as I mentioned, you will have an opportunity cost. If I'm doing something that somebody says I have to do, but there is a more innovative way of doing that.

We don’t have a single development methodology in Oracle, mostly because of acquisitions. We buy a great company, we don't tell them, "You know, that agile thing you are doing, it’s the last year. You have to do waterfall." That’s not going to work very well, but there are good practices even within those different methodologies.

Allowing for different hows is really important. Static analysis is one of them. I think static analysis is kind of industry practice now, and people should be doing it. Third party is really bad. I have been opining about this, this morning.

Third-party analysis

Let just say, I have a large customer, I won't name who used a third-party static analysis service. They broke their license agreement with us. They're getting a lot of it from us. Worse, they give us a report that included vulnerabilities from one of our competitors. I don’t want to know about those, right? I can't fix some. I did tell my competitor, "You should know this report exist, because I'm sure you want to analyze this."

Here's the worst part. How many of those vulnerabilities the third-party found you think had any merit? Run tool is nothing; analyzing results is everything. That customer and the vendor wasted the time of one of our best security leads, trying to make sure there was no there there, and there wasn't.

So again, and last but not least, government can use their purchasing power in lot of very good ways, but realize that regulatory things are probably going to lag actual practice. You could be specifying buggy whip standards and the reality is that nobody uses buggy whips anymore. It's not always about the standard, particularly if you are using resources in a less than optimal way.
This is one of the best forums I have seen, because there are people who have actual subject matter expertise to bring to the table.

One of the things I like about The Open Group is that here we have actual practitioners. This is one of the best forums I have seen, because there are people who have actual subject matter expertise to bring to the table, which is so important in saying what is going to work and can be effective.

The last thing I am going to say is a nice thank you to the people in the Trusted TTPF, because I appreciate the caliber of my colleagues, and also Sally Long. They talk about this type of an effort as herding cats, and at least for me, it's probably like herding a snarly cat. I can be very snarly. I'm sure you can pick up on that.

So I truly appreciate the professionalism and the focus and the targeting. Targeting a good slice of making a supply-chain problem better, not boiling the ocean, but very focused and targeted and with very high-caliber participation. So thank you to my colleagues and particularly thank you to Sally, and that’s it, I will turn it over to others.

Jim Hietala: We do, we have a few questions from the audience. So the first one and both here could feel free to chime in on this. Something you brought up Dr. Ross, building security in looking at software and systems engineering processes. How do you bring industry along in terms of commercial off-the-shelf products and services especially when you look at things like IoT, where we have got IP interfaces grafted on to all sorts of devices?

Ross: As Mary Ann was saying before, the strength of any standard is really its implementability out there. When we talk about, in particular, the engineering standard, the 15288 extension, if we do that correctly every organization out there who's already using -- let's say a security development lifecycle like the 27034, you can pick your favorite standard -- we should be able to reflect those activities in the different lanes of the 15288 processes.

This is a very important point that I got from Mary Ann’s discussion. We have to win the hearts and minds and be able to reflect things in a disciplined and structured process that doesn't take people off their current game. If they're doing good work, we should be able to reflect that good work and say, "I'm doing these activities whether it’s SDL, and this is how it would map to those activities that we are trying to find in the 15288."

And that can apply to the IoT. Again, it goes back to the computer, whether it’s Oracle database or a Microsoft operating system. It’s all about the code and the discipline and structure of building that software and integrating it into a system. This is where we can really bring together industry, academia, and government and actually do something that we all agree on.

Different take

Davidson: I would have a slightly different take on this. I know this is not a voice crying in the wilderness. My concern about the IoT goes back to things I learned in business school in financial market theory, which unfortunately has been borne out in 2008.

There are certain types of risks you can mitigate. If I cross a busy street, I'm worried about getting hit by a car. I can look both ways. I can mitigate that. You can't mitigate systemic risk. It means that you created a fragile system. That is the problem with the IoT, and that is a problem that no jury of engineering will solve.

If it's not a problem, why aren’t we giving nuclear weapons’ IP addresses? Okay, I am not making this up. The Air Force thought about that at one point. You're laughing. Okay, Armageddon, there is an app for that.
I really wish that people could look at this, not just in terms of how many of these devices and what a great opportunity, but what is a systemic risk that we are creating by doing this.

That's the problem. I know this is going to happen anyway. whether or not I approve of it, but I really wish that people could look at this, not just in terms of how many of these devices and what a great opportunity, but what is a systemic risk that we are creating by doing this.

My house is not connected to the Internet directly and I do not want somebody to shut my appliances off or shut down my refrigerator or lock it so that I can’t get into it or use that for launching an attack, those are the discussions we should be having -- at least as much as how we make sure that people designing these things have a clue.

Hietala: The next question is, how do customers and practitioners value the cost of security, and then a kind of related question on what can global companies due to get C-Suite attention and investment on cybersecurity, that whole ROI value discussion?

Davidson: I know they value it because nobody calls me up and says, "I am bored this week. Don’t you have more security patches for me to apply?" That’s actually true. We know what it costs us to produce a lot of these patches, and it’s important for the amount of resources we spend on that I would much rather be putting them on building something new and innovative, where we could charge money for it and provide more value to customers.

So it's cost avoidance, number one; number two more people have an IT backbone. They understand the value of having it be reliable. Probably one of the reasons people are moving to clouds is that it’s hard to maintain all these and hard to find the right people to maintain them. But also I do have more customers asking us now about our security practices, which is be careful what you wish for

I said this 10 years ago. People should be demanding. They know what we're doing and now I am going to spend a lot of time answering RFPs, but that’s good. These people are aware of this. They're running their business on our stuff and they want to know what kind of care we're taking to make sure we're protecting their data and their mission-critical applications as if it were ours.

Difficult question

Ross: The ROI question is very difficult with regard to security. I think this goes back to what I said earlier. The sooner we get security out of its stovepipe and integrated as just part of the best practices that we do everyday, whether it’s in the development work at a company or whether it’s in our enterprises as part of our mainstream organizational management things like the SDLC, or if we are doing any engineering work within the organization, or if we have the Enterprise Architecture group involved. That integration makes security less of  “hey, I am special” and more of just a part of the way we do business.

So customers are looking for reliability and dependability. They rely on this great bed of IT product systems and services and they're not always focused on the security aspects. They just want to make sure it works and that if there is an attack and the malware goes creeping through their system, they can be as protected as they need to be, and sometimes that flies way below their radar.

So it's got to be a systemic process and an organizational transformation. I think we have to go through it, and we are not quite there just yet.
So it's got to be a systemic process and an organizational transformation. I think we have to go through it, and we are not quite there just yet.

Davidson: Yeah, and you really do have to bake it in. I have a team of -- I’ve got three more headcount, hoo-hoo -- 45 people, but we have about 1,600 people in development whose jobs are to be security points of contact and security leads. They're the boots on the ground who implement our program, because I don't want to have an organization that peers over everybody’s shoulder to make sure they are writing good code. It's not cost-effective, not a good way to do it. It's cultural.

One of the ways that you do that is seeding those people in the organization, so they become the boots on the ground and they have authority to do things, because you’re not going to succeed otherwise.

Going back to Java, that was the first discussion I had with one of the executives that this is a cultural thing. Everybody needs to feel that he or she is personally responsible for security, not those 10-20 whatever those people are, whoever the security weenie is. It’s got to be everybody and when you can do that, you really have to see change and how things happen. Everybody is not going to be a security expert, but everybody has some responsibility for security.

This has been a special BriefingsDirect presentation and panel discussion from The Open Group San Diego 2015. Download a copy of the transcript. This follows an earlier discussion from the event on synergies among major Enterprise Architecture frameworks with The Open Group.

Transcript of a live panel discussion at last month's The Open Group San Diego 2015. Copyright The Open Group and Interarbor Solutions, LLC, 2005-2015. All rights reserved.

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